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In 2002 Neil Levy published an article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy (19, 2, pp. 121-130), 
“In Defence of Entrapment in Journalism (and Beyond)”. This response to Neil Levy’s recent assertion 
of a “right” of entrapment by journalists suggests that Levy’s argument is based on an inadequate 
conceptualization of both the function of journalism and nature of journalistic practice, and fails to 
take into account how the law currently impinges on journalistic practice. We put the proposition that 
legitimating journalistic use of entrapment by paralleling it with “proactive policing” is not 
established as an ethically – or legally - acceptable practice, and indeed in terms of the remerging neo-
Aristotelian ethic of virtue, is more likely to corrupt the journalistic practitioner than result in 
revelations of malfeasance in the public interest. 
 
Neil Levy1 challenges the view that deception by journalists should be 
frowned on as an ethically unsound practice. In fact he calls for greater use of 
entrapment to ensure journalists fulfill their watchdog role. Levy uses the following 
process of reasoning to justify this position. 
 
• Entrapment is defined and analysis offered when police can legitimately 
utilize this practice 2.   
• A counterfactual test to permissible entrapment is postulated 3. 
• The role of journalists is defined the role of journalists in terms of fourth 
estate ideals, with the argument that the media have two main roles: 
providing information to enable people to participate in the political 
process and a “watchdog role” of alerting people to abuses of power 4. 
• The watchdog role performed by journalists gives rise to a “right to engage 
in sting operations” targeting political and civil institutions5. He equates 
the fourth estate “institutional” watchdog role to a policing role. The 
public interest in the public being informed of “public actions of the 
officials who claim to represent them or whose decisions impact 
significantly on their lives” is the source of the journalist’s right to entrap 
officials. 
• However, Levy limits this right to institutional and official corruption 




We challenge Levy’s call for journalistic use of entrapment on a number of 
grounds. First, we question Levy’s interpretation of the legitimacy of the use of 
entrapment tactics by enforcement agencies. We then question Levy’s conception of 
journalism as the fourth estate. Levy makes two basic assumptions about the role of 
journalists in contemporary society. The first relates to the profession of journalism. 
He argues journalism is a profession, which has specific roles including an 
institutional watchdog role. He then elevates the “profession” of journalism to a civil 
institution that derives rights from the public functions it performs. The fact that most 
often journalism is a business performed under the proprietorship of some of the most 
powerful media corporations in the world is ignored by Levy.  
 
Levy’s second assumption about the role of journalists is extremely 
problematic. He equates the watchdog role of journalists to positive policing of 
institutional and official abuse. We argue a watchdog function is a far narrower 
concept than policing. We challenge Levy’s conception of journalism, arguing there is 
no real parallel between the role of journalism in society and the role of law 
enforcement. In fact, Levy’s call for greater use of entrapment journalism is 
tantamount to a call to outsource policing to international corporations, who are even 
more powerful than some sovereign states.  
 
Finally on this point, we argue the laws regulating journalists – particularly 
defamation and contempt of court laws - focus on the content of publications. When 
gathering information for publication, journalists are bound by various laws, including 
information privacy laws, trespass, nuisance and the criminal law. However, they are 
under no duty to exercise reasonable care when gathering or disseminating 
information. Therefore, if journalists made greater use of entrapment tactics, they 
would have wider powers (and be far less accountable to the public) than law 
enforcement agencies.  
 
In conclusion, we reflect on the moral status of entrapment as a form of 
consequentialist practice in which the end justifies the means. This is in 
contradistinction to the current code-based – and thus deontological - approach that 
dominates most contemporary discussion of journalism ethics. The influence of 
consequentialist approaches to ethics on the interpretation of codes is noted but the 
paper argues further questions need to be asked before sanctioning entrapment 
journalism. Recognising the growing influence of neo-Aristotelianism the question is 
posed: is entrapment permissible in an ethic based on character?  
  
1. The legitimate, and morally permissible, use of entrapment 
 
Entrapment is a legitimate practice for law enforcement agencies. Practices 
such as covert integrity testing have become an effective part of the arsenal of anti-
corruption bodies, especially those concerned with policing. Nonetheless, a vigourous 
debate still flows about the circumstances in which entrapment by law enforcement 
agencies is defensible.  
 
The distinction Levy makes between entrapment and “pro-active law 
enforcement” is problematic in that despite Levy’s attempt to make a distinction, the 
concepts are interchangeable. This is because the narrow, more restricted meaning he 
gives to the term “entrapment” applies to a legal defence, which by its very nature is 
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post hoc.  What Levy defines as “pro-active law enforcement” can become illegal 
entrapment- in Levy’s sense of the term - if the courts so determine. The same 
practice or circumstance can be pro-active law enforcement one day and illegal 
entrapment the next, and on appeal may revert to being pro-active law enforcement. 
 
The three key issues emerging from the legal debate are first, the pre-
disposition of the entrapped, secondly, the nature and scale of inducement, and 
thirdly, the risk of injury to innocent third parties or to the officers involved. Levy 
disagrees with Michael Gorr’s argument that entrapment is permissible by the state so 
long as there is no “outrageous inducement” which “is prohibited in all cases 
regardless of its likely social utility and regardless of the target’s degree of 
predisposition, because it is a fundamental violation of the right of due process” 7. 
Such circumstances might include the entrapped person being told that the criminal 
act they were being induced to commit was legal, or the level and nature of 
inducement being extraordinary, or indeed coercive. Levy choses to focus only on 
Gorr’s discussion of what might be termed the “value of the inducement”, and asserts 
the key issue is the subjective one: would this person have committed a crime in the 
absence of any proactivity by law enforcement agencies? 
 
In the United States the debate has been around the so-called “subjective test” – 
did the accused have a predisposition to commit a crime?  - and its antonym the 
“objective test” which tests the conduct of the law enforcers – were their actions within 
the law? Canvassing both, George Felkenes concluded that, “no matter which approach 
is used …there is always the moral problem of possibly enticing a person to commit a 
crime who would otherwise not have done so” 8.  Levy attempts to construct an 
alternative to the subjective/objective test dichotomy in terms of a “counterfactual test” 
– which is based on the likelihood of an offence being committed 9. How does one 
calculate such likelihood? On the balance of probabilities? Beyond reasonable doubt? 
And who carries the burden of proof?  
 
The proposition put by Stitt and James that a judgement should be made on an 
evidentiary basis is a much more satisfactory one: 
…it is legitimate for law enforcement officials to test to see if someone 
is corrupted, it is not legitimate for them to test to see if someone is 
corruptible. No one should be offered the opportunity to commit a 
crime unless there is probable evidence that he is engaged in ongoing 
criminal activity10. 
 
Stitt and James advance a strong argument against entrapment on the basis that 
it is inconsistent with democratic rights – rights which, of course, the “fourth estate” 
are committed to upholding. 
 
There is, however, a crucial difference between law enforcement agencies using 
entrapment and its use by journalists. In the case of law enforcement agencies, courts 
have the capacity to make a judgement as to whether the process of entrapment was 
unjust. As a result of this determination, the process triggered by the entrapment is 
either ceased (a complete defence to prosecution), the consequences of it are reduced 
(in terms of mitigation of sentence) or, if legitimately used, the prosecution succeeds. 
In the case of journalism, any determination of the court about the legitimacy of the 
entrapment must be in the form of injunctive relief, otherwise the court determination 
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on legitimacy will have no effect. The publication will still go ahead and sanctions 
sought will be retrospective. The watchdog role of journalists is expanded from positive 
policing to include adjudicators of right and wrong (functions usually reserved for 
courts of law).  Watchdogs exceeding their powers face an uncertain fate. 
 
There is a world of difference between establishing a set of criteria, as Levy 
does, which legitimate entrapment for the purposes of law enforcement and then 
applying these same criteria to the practice of journalism. This gives journalistic 
practice a legitimacy and status it does not inherently possess. Despite decades of 
rhetoric – mainly from journalists - about journalism as the watchdog of democracy, 
the constitutional arrangements of liberal democratic societies have not been changed 




2. The functions of the media 
 
Levy relies on the Fourth Estate ideal to legitimize his call for journalistic use of 
entrapment when investigating institutional and official corruption. He implicity 
claims these watchdog roles give rise to a moral right of entrapment. He goes on to 
argue that journalistic use of entrapment is also justified to ameliorate the chilling 
effect of defamation laws. However, Levy does not give any detail of how a 
journalist's moral right to entrapment would be given effect. 
 
In this next section, we deal with Levy's conception of journalism as the Fourth 
Estate, arguing his call for journalistic use of entrapment is based on an idealized 
view of journalism. We also discuss the regulatory environment in journalism is 
performed, arguing industry codes of ethics and laws which restrict journalistic 
publication already take account of the public interest issues raised by Levy through  
defences and guidance clauses. We conclude that journalists do not have a moral right 
to entrapment, pointing out the problems identified by Levy could be overcome by 
reforming the accountability processes of police, expanding recognised legal defences 
available to publishers, adopting ethical guidance clauses (similar to Australia's Media 
Entertainment Arts Alliance (Australian Journalists' Association) Code of Practice) 
and focussing more on developing journalistic virtues. 
 
 
“The fourth estate” 
 
As described by Levy, the media have two main functions in a democracy. 
First, to convey information and provide a forum for public debate which fosters an 
“informed and responsible” decision on electoral decision-making, and secondly, “A 
watchdog role, alerting the public to abuses of power”11. Such a chaste theory of 
journalism is certainly the way many journalists see themselves and reflects a 
conceptualisation of the media as “the fourth estate”. This notion is attributed to the 
nineteenth century English essayist, Thomas Carlyle, who in turn attributed the idea to 
Edmund Burke. In On Heroes (first published in 1841), Carlyle wrote: 
 
Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the 
Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important 
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than they all…Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation, 
becomes a power, a branch of government, with inalienable weight in 
law-making, in all acts of authority 12. 
 
The concept is now applied to describe the role and function of journalism in a 
liberal democratic society, in very much the terms suggested by Levy. However such a 
view does not account for the historical fixedness of the proposition, parallelling, as it 
did, the rise of the nation state, and drawing its essential function, that of “watchdog of 
democracy”, from the view that it was the encroaching power of the state which 
constituted the greatest threat to the freedom of expression 13. The rise of supra-national 
institutions of both governance and commerce renders such a linkage archaic and more 
thoughtful proponents of the idea now recognize such deficiencies 14. The notion of the 
fourth estate is a journalistic ideal to which journalists aspire. It does not reflect the 
reality of what journalism is.  
 
Levy’s description of the functions of journalism does not account for 
alternative conceptualisations of the role and function of journalism, especially those 
which argue the social construction of news – that news represents what journalists 
want to report - and that news -most particularly that produced by commercial 
organisations - both reflects and represents the interests of the owners of the news 
organisations, the so-called “political economy of journalism”. 
 
 
The social construction of news and the economic imperative of news organisations 
 
Drawing on Luckman and Berger, Garfinkel, Goffman and Schutz 15, who 
themselves draw on Husserl, Bergson and Weber, Gaye Tuchman’s Making News. A 
Study in the Construction of Reality in 1978 was the first of many such sociological 
studies of newswokers and news organisations. “News,” writes Tuchman, “is a social 
resource whose construction limits an analytic understanding of contemporary life” 16. 
Secondly, with the exception of some publicly funded broadcast media such as the 
BBC in the UK, the ABC in Australia, the CBC in Canada, and the PBS in the US, the 
vast majority of media organisations – particularly in the print media – are commercial 
organisations for whom making a profit is an imperative equal to, or more important 
than, being a watchdog guarding against the abuse of power. 
 
If we acknowledge the commercial imperative of the mass media, then to 
legitimate entrapment as a journalistic practice, is to licence commercial organisations 
to engage in a practice, which, whatever its public interest merits, also produces private 
gain for the media organisation’s shareholders. Moreover, the granting of such license 
is without the prospect of an open and transparent process of judicial review, which 
both circumscribes and validates the use of entrapment by law enforcement agencies, a 
process which ensures that both the public interest of exposing misconduct and the civil 
rights of the entrapped are preserved. Are newsroom decisions about entrapment as 
transparent, or as open to public scrutiny, as the decisions of law enforcement 
agencies? One can only imagine the response from commercial editors and producers 
when a public interest group asked to be present with video camera to record their next 
discussion about the publication of material gained through entrapment! 
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Together the social construction of news and the commercial imperative of 
media organisations mean that news outlets are not going to consistently broadcast or 
publish stories that are not in their commercial or professional interests. Once we move 
away from the notion of the “fourth estate”, which implicitly legitimises the use of 
entrapment as a journalistic tool, to account for both social constructivism and political 
economy in the role and function of journalism, then any moral argument for the 
legitimisation of entrapment falls away. Who legitimises commercial organisations, or 
even public broadcasters, to employ a practice, which is carefully scrutinised, subject to 
checks and balances, and yet still controversial, as an instrument of law enforcement? 
Levy’s argument justifying entrapment journalism is founded on an idealized view of 
journalism.  
 
The legal status of journalism and entrapment 
 
Journalism is part of the mass media, which in the Australian context for 
example, the Australian High Court has recognised as being the conduit by which 
individuals derive the information essential to take part in democracy. In the 1992 Free 
Speech Cases 17 the High Court of Australia “distilled” from the Commonwealth 
Constitution an implied freedom of political communication. More recent Australian 
cases 18 have acknowledged the role of the mass media, and in particular journalists, as 
the conduits by which the public access political and government information arising 
from particular sections of the constitution that guarantee representative democracy. 
The constitutional recognition of the role of journalists is limited to providing 
information “necessary for the effective operation of the system of representative and 
responsible government” 19. It is limited to communication between electors and the 
elected representative on political or government matters arising at a local, state, 
territory, federal or international level 20. 
 
The notion of representative democracy in the Australian constitution works to 
limit laws that unnecessarily hinder the public's access to political and government 
information. The freedom derived from the Constitution does not extend to commercial 
speech or civil institutions that are non-political. It is not a positive right; it is a 
negative immunity that limits the application of any state, territory or federal law which 
burden freedom of communication about government or political matters 21. If this 
threshold is met, then it must be asked whether the law is reasonably appropriate and 
adapted to serve a legitimate end, the fulfilment of which is compatible with the 
maintenance of the system of government prescribed by the Australian constitution22?  
 
These are the type of questions Levy needed to pose to justify journalistic use of 
entrapment. Does a journalist’s inability to entrap in the investigation of institutional 
and official abuse limit the communication of information on political and government 
matters 23?  The next question he needs to ask is whether the laws relating to 
entrapment and the journalist's ability to investigate stories of institutional and official 
abuse are reasonably adapted and are appropriate? Is limiting entrapment to law 
enforcement agencies compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally 
prescribed system of government24? One expects courts will answer “yes” to this 
second question because the defence of entrapment is available against police and 
prosecutors, who have been delegated authority to investigate and prosecute claims of 
criminality. The common convenience and welfare of society does not require the 
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profession of journalism, whose system of accountability lacks any real teeth, taking on 
positive policing functions.  
 
 
In addition to his claim that journalists need recourse to entrapment to fulfil 
their fourth estate roles, Levy argues journalistic use of entrapment is justified to 
ameliorate the chilling effect of defamation. The question, which needs to be asked by 
Levy when attacking the restrictive nature of defamation law, is whether the legal and 
ethical restrictions facing journalists burden the public’s access to political and 
government information? If the public’s access to political information is unreasonably 
burdened is there a case for investing journalists with a right to entrapment or 
sanctioning the use of entrapment25. Levy’s arguments in this area are unconvincing 
and he needs to do more to explain how the public’s access to political and government 
information is curtailed by limiting pro-active policing to the policing professionals. 
 
Again, to use an Australian example, the Australian High Court has found that 
the "chilling effect" of defamation laws, in relation to political and government 
communications, is overcome by expanding the common law qualified privilege 
defence. As a result of the High Court decision in Lange v ABC, mass media 
publications are immune from liability in defamation suits where defamatory 
statements are of a political or government nature and they are published reasonably 
without malice. The joint judgements (delivered by Mason, Toohey and Gaudron) in 
Stephens v Western Australian Newspapers26 and Theophanous v Herald and Weekly 
Times27 described political and government information as “criticism of the views, 
performance and capacity of a Member of Parliament and of the member’s fitness for 
public office”28. The High Court unanimously stated in Lange v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation that a publication will not be reasonable unless the publisher 
had reasonable grounds for believing the imputation to be true, took proper steps to 
verify the accuracy of the material and did not believe the imputation to be untrue 29.  
This has become known as an expanded form of common law qualified privilege. 
 
Verification of the accuracy of information is essential to attract the expanded 
qualified privilege defence in defamation actions. Therefore Australian journalists do 
have a constitutionally recognised watchdog role, in the sense that journalists must test 
the accuracy of political and government information before they publish in order to 
attract the expanded privilege defence. But the Constitutional acknowledgement of the 
"watchdog role" of journalism does not give rise to any rights beyond those of the 
average citizen. It limits laws that unnecessarily restrict the public's ability to access 
political and government information. It also permits publication of defamatory 
statements about political and government matters that are published reasonably 
without malice. This expanded common law privilege defence does not extend to non 
political or non-government information. Given the development of trans-national 
corporations, it may be arguable that the common convenience and welfare of society 
requires an expansion of the qualified privilege defence in relation to investigations 
into corporate corruption and abuse. The categories of privilege are not closed and can 
be expanded. But the expansion of common law privilege is dependent on the common 
convenience and welfare of society, not the "rights" of journalists.  
 
The controversial decision of the Australian High Court in Dow Jones v 
Gutnick30 suggests the courts may be willing to entertain arguments about the 
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expansion of common privilege defences in defamation actions. Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ stated the "reasonableness" of a publisher's conduct may be 
taken into account by courts where the publisher's conduct has occurred outside the 
jurisdiction. But the reasonableness of that conduct would be determined according to 
the legal standards of the jurisdiction in which the conduct occurred: in any jurisdiction 
(even the US) the use of deception to obtain information would be unlikely to be 
viewed as reasonable. 
 
Defamation law is not the only obstacle to journalistic publication. We argue 
that despite the restrictions facing journalists, there is no justification for legitimising 
the use entrapment tactics when gathering information for publication. Previously, this 
article examined the parallels between journalism and police in relation to the duties 
they perform. It was acknowledged the courts adjudicated the legitimacy of police use 
of entrapment, whereas the courts could only retrospectively reflect on journalistic 
entrapment. This section seeks to examine the journalistic regulatory environment in 
more detail, arguing the current legal and professional accountability framework 
negates any expansion of journalistic forensic capabilities to include a right to entrap. 
At the most, account could be taken of the overriding public interest in the information 
published when determining liability arising from its circulation.  
 
In Westminster style jurisdictions such as Australia and the UK, police are 
accountable to their employers (the Crown) through a system of internal discipline. 
They are also accountable at common law to the public they serve. Tronc 31 concludes 
that police are subject to the law of negligence. He warns that statutory immunity of 
police from prosecution is capable of being limited on public interest grounds. The 
reasonableness of police behaviour in terms of negligence and statutory immunity is 
dependent on the overall circumstances and whether police have acted in accordance 
with training and instructions. Finally, Tronc warns that “police attending incidents 
must seek to obtain all the information they can and explore all the options open to 
them before taking any course which may result in injury”32.  
 
Police officers are admitted to the police force after completing specific training 
and undergoing tests regarding their character. They are bound by rules and 
regulations, setting minimum standards of conduct, which are subject to internal 
review. While the effectiveness of police accountability processes is frequently 
questioned, police are open to professional scrutiny internally (internal review) and 
externally (tort of negligence). Sanctions open to internal review bodies range from 
apologies and or explanations, cautions, charging with a criminal offence to dismissal 
from the police force.  Issues of inefficiency and ineffectiveness of these sanctions 
should be addressed in a review of the processes, procedures, sanctions and education 
and training of police officers; expanding the forensic capabilities of journalists. 
 
By contrast the regulatory environment in which journalists operate is quite 
different. First, journalism is an open profession and there is no formal assessment of 
character relating to an individual’s entry into the profession/craft. Anyone can 
describe himself or herself as a journalist. There are various self-regulatory bodies to 
which journalists may be accountable. But most of these bodies are voluntary, in the 
sense that journalists must become members to be bound by the codes. Self-regulatory 
bodies have limited sanctions to encourage good conduct. In Australia, for example, 
these sanctions range from publication of adjudications 33 to fines imposed on the 
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journalists individually by the journalists’ union, the Media, Entertainment and Arts 
Alliance (MEAA) or on the broadcast licensee, the Australian Broadcasting Authority, 
(ABA). 34 
 
At present, journalists and media proprietors have no duty of care to publish 
the truth, they have “a duty not to defame without justification or privilege or 
otherwise than by way of fair comment”35. Justice Levine, in Sattin v Nationwide 
News Pty Ltd36, observed:  
Publications in instruments of mass communication involve competing 
questions of freedom of speech and protection of reputation…the law 
deals with those competing questions by means of  ‘compromises’. 
The resolution of that tension between the two competing interests is 
represented by the law of defamation at common law and by its 
statutory modifications…. The introduction into the law of defamation 
especially involving instruments of mass communication of some 
common law duty of care to “get the publication right” would amount 
to an unacceptable distortion of the principles of common law (as 
affected by statute) in the law of defamation relating to the balancing 
of freedom of speech and protection of reputation37.  
 
By the same token, journalists are not under a duty of care when gathering 
information for publication other than to respect confidences and not to unlawfully 
intrude into private aspects of people’s lives as prescribed by the laws of trespass, 
nuisance and information privacy. Therefore, a journalist engaged in entrapment 
would be less accountable than police officers, who undergo specified training to 
engage in these practices. The common convenience and welfare of society does not 
justify sanctioning journalistic use of entrapment. Decisions about the legitimacy of 
journalistic investigations will be assessed in light of the public interest they serve. It 
is hard to envisage a situation where the public interest will be served by perpetrating 
a deception: but in extreme situations it may be arguable that such tactics do serve the 
public interest. Then the publisher would need to show that the conduct of the 
journalist did not go beyond what was necessary to satisfy the public interest.  
 
Another area of law, which needs to be discussed in relation to journalistic 
entrapment, is the contempt of court rules. In the system derived from the English 
common law, the sub judice rules preclude the publication of material posing a 
serious risk or tendency to prejudice pending proceedings. The laws aim to balance 
fundamental human rights: the right of freedom of speech38 against the need to protect 
the proper administration of justice, particularly the right of an individual to a fair 
trial39. In criminal proceedings, the sub judice period begins at the time of arrest or at 
the time of charging in Australia and in England it is when charging is imminent. 
Unless journalists can prove there is an overriding public interest, publication of 
information relating to pending proceedings is limited to the bare facts including the 
name, age and address of the accused person and the circumstances of the arrest. Any 
material that is likely to be in issue during the trial (including the physical 
identification of accused) cannot be published until the sub judice period ends, or as a 
fair and accurate report of the proceedings. 
 
The contempt laws specifically limit the role of journalists if the performance 
of their duty interferes with the administration of justice. The contempt laws will 
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become an absurdity if a journalist becomes involved in the investigation and arrest of 
a person suspected of committing a crime and report on their involvement. Journalists 
will be assuming the role of the courts, and the accused is denied their right to a fair 
trail. Thus the administration of justice is undermined. If they do not report the story, 
their involvement in the investigation becomes redundant (because the public does not 
hear of the corruption). This makes journalistic involvement in the investigation of 
crime a business absurdity.  
 
The contempt laws do recognise a public interest defence, but this has rarely 
been successful and the assessment of public interest is retrospective. The defence is 
used to justify publication after the damage has been done: the accused person has 
been tried by the media and the official role of the judicial system usurped. 
 
 There are several points to draw from this discussion: 
• The use of entrapment by journalists changes their role from a watchdog to 
a positive policing and judicial role, because the media will arbitrate 
before the court will have the opportunity to hear the case. 
• Public interest defences take account of the fact that the public's need to 
access information may override the individuals’ rights of privacy or fair 
trial. 
• The privilege defences take account of where the public interest in 
receiving information overrides and individual's right to protect their 
reputation. 
• The conduct of the journalist must not be assessed according to rights and 
duties but according to the public interest being served. The rights vest in 
the public not journalists. 
• Given the perceived corruptibility of journalists, the law should not 
sanction a right of entrapment.   
 
Finally in this section we need to look at the effects of journalistic entrapment. 
If the watchdog functions arising under the Australian Constitution were seen to give 
rise to a moral/legal right of entrapment for journalists, the courts would require the 
journalist to carry the burden of proof that their conduct was reasonable. The “right” 
of entrapment would potentially threaten the confidential relationship between 
sources and journalists. While journalists have no general right not to reveal their 
sources, the Newspaper Rule acknowledges that a publisher defendant “will not be 
compelled during preliminary proceedings to disclose the name of the writer of the 
article or the sources upon which it was based” 40. If journalists were seeking to 
justify entrapment tactics, according to the tests set out previously they would need to 
reveal the source of information which formed the basis of their suspicions in order to 
justify their actions. This raises the question of moral and legal priority. 
 
This discussion suggests the courts are unlikely to recognise the rights of 
journalists to engage in pro-active law enforcement functions. Levy’s arguments to 
legitimise journalistic use of entrapment are simply unsustainable in the current legal 
environment. But we go further to argue journalistic use of entrapment should not be 




3. The moral status of entrapment 
 
Finally in this response to Levy’s article, we investigate the moral status of 
entrapment. We see the central problem of Levy’s argument is that it is based on 
casuistry. While casuistry may have a place in assisting the resolution of particular 
ethical issues where the participants hold to competing principles, there is a remarkable 
level of unanimity among journalists about the moral principles upon which their 
practice is based. These principles – fairness, accuracy, balance - are reflected in the 
codes of various organisations of journalists. 
 
Casuistry seeks to work inductively from cases, comparing like with like, 
whereas deontological moral reasoning is deductive. Until recently it was largely 
discredited as a form of moral reasoning 41. It has been revived, largely in the field of 
bioethics, through the work of Stephen Toulmin and Albert Jonsen, but not without 
some trenchant criticism42. The advantage of using such a method is that people who 
hold different principles can often come to agreement on the solution to a particular 
problem without the necessity to compromise on the principles they hold. However, 
casuistry is an explicitly non-principled form of moral reasoning, and still has some 
way to go before it is rehabilitated as a universally acceptable form of moral reasoning. 
Boeyink makes a case for the use of casuistry in journalism ethics, but not a convincing 
one. Skating over casuistry’s problematic past in one paragraph, Boeyink posits 
casuistry as a middle way between a situation ethics which sees each case as unique 
and an “absolutism” in which cases are “the passive raw material to which moral 
principles are applied”43, a sort of systematized situationalism. It would seem that a 
newsroom culture that defined its ethical values on evolving precedents was at greater 
risk of unethical conduct than one based on a shared and agreed set of principles 
(deontology) or on dispositions of character (virtue). 
 
The core of the argument for legitimising the use of entrapment is that the end – 
the public exposure of graft, corruption or misconduct – justifies the use of subterfuge 
and deception in exposing the conduct under question. There is of course, no guarantee 
that when a journalist exposes such activities and behaviour that criminal sanctions will 
result. The journalist is principally interested in the story, not the admissibility of 
evidence in a criminal court where a higher standard of proof is required than is usual 
in a defamation case, which, except in exceptionally rare circumstances, is a civil case. 
On the other hand, law enforcement agencies are concerned to acquire admissible 
evidence; their motivation and intent is to secure a criminal conviction. That is their 
public duty. Because of these different interests, journalists are likely to be less 
thorough – and perhaps less effective - in their exposure of corruption. They only need 
sufficient evidence to avoid a defamation case; law enforcement agencies need 
sufficient evidence to secure criminal convictions. 
 
This consequentialist approach which essentially places the self interest of the 
journalist and their news organisation ahead of the public interest, somewhat 
undermines the moral high ground upon which proponents of the use of entrapment by 
journalists might like to stand. Indeed, philosophers such as John R S Wilson would 
argue that (morally unacceptable) entrapment by journalists leads to even more morally 
unacceptable exploitation: “If entrapment is the treacherous acquisition of power over a 
person, exploitation is the exercise of such power for selfish ends”44.  
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In his arguments for the use of entrapment by journalists, Levy offers a number 
of suggestions about why inducements should be part of the investigative journalists’ 
arsenal. First, entrapment may be the only way to discover the existence of corruption. 
Secondly, fear of defamation proceedings may deter journalists and media 
organisations with well-grounded suspicions but insufficient proof, and finally, 
reporting to police may be untenable if police are suspected of corruption.  
 
 In the following sections we examine these claims arguing that Levy has 
ignored the legal ramifications of vesting journalists with policing powers. In 
addressing Levy’s arguments on defamation, we see a need to give particular attention 




It is correct that entrapment may well be the only way to discover corruption. 
The real question is: who does the entrapment? Covert integrity testing is now widely 
used in policing as a means of identifying corrupt officers. This is a legitimate and 
appropriate use of entrapment. As the risk of being accused of engaging in casuistry by 
citing a case, the legal and moral uncertainty surrounding the use of entrapment by 
“journalists” is well illustrated by a recent Australian court case in which the Brisbane 
Courier-Mail reported: 
 
A freelance reporter was yesterday convicted of faking an 
illness to obtain a medical certificate using a hidden video camera to 
tape the visit for a segment on Channel 9's A Current Affair program45. 
[John Michael] …Chapman, 40, a freelance reporter and licensed 
private investigator, yesterday pleaded guilty in the Brisbane 
Magistrate's Court to a charge of false representation. Solicitor 
Nicholas Bailey, for Chapman, said his client had been employed as a 
reporter by Nine at the time of his visit to Dr Dutton and was acting on 
instructions when he posed as a patient in distress. He said Chapman 
was a pawn in reporting the story using a hidden camera and was 
unaware that his actions were an offence under the law. The court was 
told Chapman believed his actions where in the public interest, but 
admitted the way in which he obtained the certificate was a case of 
false representation. Magistrate Stephanie Tonkin told Chapman he 
should consider himself lucky he had been charged under the Vagrants, 
Gaming and other Offences Act 1931 -- as the offence carried a 
maximum penalty of $100. She then fined him that amount46. 
 
This case raises several issues. If, as Levy argues, entrapment is a legitimate 
proactive tool in the fight against crime and misconduct, and journalists can be trusted 
to use it responsibly within appropriate limits, why was the defendant, on the admission 
of his solicitor, ignorant of the basics of the law under which he was charged? 
Secondly, why were not those who gave the instructions – the program’s producers - 
brought before the court to explain their role in commissioning an offence? Thirdly, 
why was it that the television network hired private investigators as reporters, and did 
not use their staff reporters or producers? A tacit admission – well founded, as it turned 
out – that there was quicksand underfoot. Finally, the case raises the possibility that 
Chapman was himself the victim of entrapment; being induced by payment from the 
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network to engage in conduct which he professed not to know was illegal. Surely, in 
commissioning him, the producers were morally obliged to warn him that he was about 
to commit a crime, albeit in the cause of a greater public interest. Or was Chapman left 
exposed on the frontline, the victim of a newsroom culture that held him to be an 
expendable mercenary in the ratings war? 
 
Journalism commentators have struggled with the use of deceptive practices to 
gather information. Elliott47 refers to four degrees of deception. She identifies these 
deceptions, ranking from the most acceptable to the most heinous. The four levels of 
deception are:  
1. A primary lack of identification. According to Elliott, lack of identification is 
the most acceptable form of journalistic deception stating that journalists are 
under no duty to disclose their identity when checking out every story.48 But she 
states that a source’s right to privacy gives rise to a right to know the identity of 
a reporter once an interview is commenced. 
 
2. Passive misrepresentation, where a journalist is present at a meeting where 
participants do not realise there is media coverage. Elliott states journalists are 
under a duty to provide identification as soon as practicable.49  
 
3. Active misrepresentation, which Elliott claims should be condemned because of 
the “feelings of betrayal that inevitably arises and because of the diminished 
trust it produces” 50. 
 
4. Masquerading, which Elliott claims is generally eschewed because if “the great 
damage it does to the trust that people need for general societal relationships 
and for relationships with journalists in particular 51. 
 
Elliott is employing an approach to ethics in which she measures the morality of 
the action by the effect it produces and if it produces the greatest good for the greatest 
number of people then the action is ethical. While focussing on outcome of the action, 
Elliott described “rules” of practice which should govern conduct “the general 
acceptance of which would produce the greatest balance between pleasure over pain”52. 
Elliott is adopting a rule utilitarian approach to deception. 
 
Hodges53 criticises Elliott’s thesis as fundamentally flawed for two reasons. 
First, at all levels of deception the intent is the same “to gain some advantage by 
deception by not letting the other party know exactly what is going on”. Secondly, the 
source/subject is equally deceived and equally taken in at all levels.  Hodges54 argues 
that “the journalist’s decision to deceive by passive means, by not telling, is every bit as 
active or deliberate as the decision to deceive by active means”. However, Hodges55 
claims all levels of deception are justifiable by the same rules which include: 
 
• The information sought must be of overriding public interest56  
• There must be no reasonable likelihood that comparably accurate 
and reliable information could be obtained as efficiently through convention 
investigative techniques57  
• Would the deception seriously endanger innocent people?58   
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Hodges opts for a deontological approach to justifying journalists employing 
deceptive practices when gathering information for publication, prescribing rules, 
which determine whether the practice is ethical. Such approaches tend to support 
Levy’s contention that entrapment tactics can be justified where there is an overriding 
public interest. 
 
However, there are signs, small signs, that journalism as a profession is 
beginning to move away from a deontological approach to ethics to one based on 
character. The first step along the path towards virtue is to construct codes in terms of 
values rather than rules. For example, the recent re-write of the code of ethics for 
Australian journalists saw prominence given to the values of honesty, fairness, 
independence and respect for the rights of others. In an ethic of virtue “…moral virtue 
comes about as a result of habit”59, and according Aristotle, 
 
… the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the 
case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can 
do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by 
building and lyre players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by 
doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing 
brave acts…Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like 
activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain 
kind60. 
 
From this we can draw the conclusion that in Aristotle’s view, subterfuge and 
misrepresentation, the qualities which characterise entrapment, will foster the habits of 
subterfuge and misrepresentation. By engaging in entrapment as a constant practice, the 
habits of subterfuge and misrepresentation become part of the character of the 
individual. An ethic of virtue is thus intolerant of entrapment as a legitimate work 
practice. 
 
Based on a virtue approach to ethics, the practice of entrapment is 
unsustainable. But legally there are problems with Levy’s approach, even in the 
Australian context where the High Court of Australia has given some constitutional 




At an international level there are protocols against the bribery of corrupt 
foreign officials since the United States, for example, passed the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act in 1977.  
 
There has been a concerted international effort to eradicate corruption  - 
particularly the payment of bribes to foreign officials. Since the 1997 OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions came into force in 1999, jurisdictions within the OECD, 
including Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, South 
Korea, Canada, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia as well as the 




At a jurisdictional level there are a growing number of corruption prevention 
and investigation agencies. In Hong Kong, the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption, was established in 1974 and established a fearsome reputation as a 
corruption buster. In the Australian state of NSW a similarly named body was 
established in 1988, while in the neighbouring state of Queensland, the Crime and 
Misconduct Commission (formerly the Criminal Justice Commission) has maintained 
the powers of a standing Royal Commission since 1989. 
 
Again in Westminster style jurisdictions there have been are a range of other 
state institutions and mechanisms which emerged during the second half of the 
twentieth century to protect individuals and groups against the abuse of power: 
practices such as judicial review, the creation of ombudsmen, the establishment of anti-
discrimination and human rights commissions and administrative appeals tribunals, 
whistle blower protection legislation, the expanded role of parliamentary committees, 
legislation to protect privacy, and to permit freedom of information, and the assertion 
of a more vigorous role by Auditors-General. Diligence in reporting the activities of 
such agencies, and following through on the cases they pursue, will engage the 
attention of eager investigative journalists with the need to resort to subterfuge. In the 
golden days of yellow journalism, before the establishment of such institutions and 
mechanisms as part of the apparatus of the well-governed liberal democratic state, there 
was perhaps a legitimate role for media organisations to play in using entrapment to 




Levy has pursued the notion of a “right” of entrapment for journalists, first by 
creating an argument based on the principles of pro-active law enforcement – an 
essentially legal argument - and secondly by suggesting a moral imperative for the use 
of entrapment by journalists – essentially a moral argument. Entrapment by journalists 
is not legally or ethically permissible, even where there is overriding public interest in 
the outcome of the action. It is not permissible because it is not morally or legally 
justifiable for journalists to perform policing roles. At the highest level of their role in 
society, journalists are watchdogs. A “watchdog” is “watchful guardian as of morals, 
standards” 61. Journalists who utilise methods of entrapment cannot be watchful 
guardians of the morals or standards of society; they simply work to undermine the 
integrity, standards and traditions of journalism and any vestiges of legitimacy that 
performance of a watchdog role may have in a world increasingly dominated by 
globalised, commercial media.  
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